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Abstract
Corruption is a function of its return relative to engaging in productive activities.  
This paper presents an approach for thinking about the institutional features of societies 
and the resulting amount of corruption.  The empirical results suggest that political 
competition is more important than competition in information-producing industries.  
The rent-seeking view of the relation between government and corruption is rejected in 
favor of the Becker (1983) model of political competition.  The paper suggests that 
societies that continually stay open to productivity-enhancing activities will eventually 
enter a takeoff stage of anti-corruption efforts analogous to the eventual improvement in 
income distribution that occurs in successful industrialization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corruption is a topic that has soared in importance in the development community 
in recent years.  Its role as an impediment to modernization has been empirically 
documented by Mo (2001) and Mauro (1995).  Its capacity to distort public resource-use 
decisions has been demonstrated by Tanzi and Davoodi (2000), and has been interpreted 
as rent-seeking by Krueger (1974).  Its endogenous generation has been traced in 
Mohtadi and Roe (2003) and Barreto (2000).  Another influential theoretical approach 
has been that of Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993, hereafter MSV), who in the 
Hirshleifer (1991) tradition depict the amount of rent-seeking as a function of the relative 
return to appropriative as opposed to productive activity. 
 The relation between technological progress and corruption is one that merits 
more study.  This relation, suggested by but not explicitly explored in earlier work, has 
powerful implications for corruption control.  It suggests that policies that increase 
productivity can endogenously control corruption by decreasing the desirability of 
producing rent-seeking opportunities.  This paper derives precise conditions whereby 
progress in productive technology makes corruption control more worthwhile, and tests 
whether these conditions hold.  The empirical results allow for re-interpretation of the 
expected effectiveness of corruption control at various stages of development.  Sections 1 
and 2 explore endogenous corruption where production is available as an alternative, 
Section 3 tests the model and Section 4 re-interprets corruption control in light of the 
findings. 
 
1.  The returns to parasitism 
 One empirical fact about corruption readily suggests itself – that it is inversely 
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related to a nation’s per capita income.  Figure 1 plots the 2003 ratings of the anti-
corruption group Transparency International – ranging from zero to ten, with zero the 
most corrupt – against per capita income in 2000, obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database.  The relationship is somewhat concave, with a 
regression of the TI score on per capita GDP and per capita GDP squared included for 
comparison.1  Rich countries are corrupt, poor ones are not, and there are a striking 
number of countries with almost minimal per capita income and high degrees of 
corruption.  Roughly half the countries in the world, in other words, are in a low-income, 
high-corruption equilibrium, one of two outcomes predicted by the MSV model.  The 
relation between income and corruption has been explored empirically by Paldam (2002) 
using a single-equation model. 
Per capita GDP
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Figure 1: Corruption and per capita income. 
                                                 
1.  The regression is 2.484125 + 0.0003286 PCGDP – 4.23E-09 PCGDP2 (n = 122, F = 
322.50, R2 = 0.8247.  
 2
The traditional explanation for this relationship is that corruption destroys growth, 
so that fighting corruption is causally prior to successful industrialization.  But suppose 
the reverse is true – that growth causes corruption reduction.  As societies become more 
productive,2 it is conceivable that a unit of resources devoted to appropriation becomes 
more costly.  If so, the members of society may find it less attractive or be willing to 
endure a greater burden to fight it.   
 A tantalizing hint of that possibility is depicted in figure 2.  The vertical axis is 
the 1996 TI rating, and the horizontal axis shows Solow residuals for a production 
function based on Penn World Tables data of the logarithm of GDP on the logarithms of 
the capital stock and workers in the country.  A fitted line of the regression of the rating 
on the residual is also included, and the correlation between the residual and the TI rating 
is 0.4222.3  Productivity is not the sole determinant of corruption, but it may matter in 
important ways. 
                                                 
2.  The term “productivity” will denote the return to resources used in income production 
rather than appropriation, unless otherwise noted.  
3.  The regression depicted is RATING = 1.5846 + .0733 RESID (p < .007, R2 = 0.1782, N 
=39), where RESID is a residual calculated from a standard Solow growth regression.   
That regression is LOGQ = 3.5873 + 0.6456 LOGK + 0.3309 LOGL (R2 = 0.9542, N = 
60, both variables significant at p = 0.001).  K is nonresidential capital per worker, and L 
is the number of workers in the population (calculated using the figure from PWT 5.6 on 
the percentage of workers in the population). 
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Solow  residuals
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Figure 2 – Corruption and productivity. 
 The argument can be simply illustrated.  Let the basic production function for the 
economy be Y = Af(l).  l is total input of labor to productive activity, and f has the 
standard textbook properties of production functions.  There are positive but diminishing 
returns throughout, so that fl > 0, fll < 0.  Assume also that f(0) = 0 and .  To 
illustrate the argument as parsimoniously as possible, assume that government has no role 
in providing public services in and of themselves.  Its only functions are to restrict the 
options in private production.  This can be modeled by having the government be simply 
a dispenser of permits.  X is the number of such permits that exist.  These can be thought 
of as inputs that must be purchased to enable production, even though they come at a cost 
of deadweight loss in production.  The model is thus of rent-seeking not just as diversion 
of productive effort but as outright parasitism.  Factors are not just diverted, but used 
inefficiently.  One might imagine that each permit is a weight that a worker must strap to 
his back when entering the workplace.  The permits stand for real economic phenomena 
0
)0(lim
→
∞=
l
f
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involving artificially inefficient factor use – requirements to do business with the family 
members of government officials or with other firms who have also paid bribes, to pay 
extra for domestic products shielded from foreign competition, etc.  Assume then that 
production once permits exist is actually Y' ≡ Af(l)[1 – t(X)], where X is the number of 
permits and t′ > 0, t′′ < 0 and t(0) = 0.    
Permits are paid for like labor, out of produced income. And like output, 
they are generated by applying the only scarce resource, labor, according to X = 
g(e; α), with ge > 0, gee < 0.   α is a shift-parameter vector that is negatively related 
to the marginal productivity of effort in creating permits, so that geα < 0.  It can be 
thought of as the extent to which social institutions mitigate against successful 
rent-seeking.   
The economy operates under a full employment constraint: 
 
 e + l = N,          (1) 
 
with N the economy’s labor endowment.  Government is thus not a single entity that 
pursues some objective (e.g., maximizing welfare, payoffs to supporters or votes), but an 
outlet for entrepreneurial endeavor like productive activity. 
 Total income produced accrues either to laborers or to permit producers: 
 
Y = wee + wll.          (2) 
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 we and wl are the wages in each activity.  They will be equal to the value of 
marginal product: 
 
we = pge(.),          (3) 
 
wl = Afl(.)[1 – t(X)].         (4) 
 
p is the price of permits, measured against the numeraire, income.  The model is 
closed by imposing the equilibrium condition that the marginal return to labor in the two 
activities is equal: 
 
we = wl.          (5) 
  
Given the exogenous α, there are thus eight unknowns – the wage rates we and wl, 
the permit price p, total consumption C, total labor devoted to each activity e and l, 
permits produced X and output produced Y.  Some important figures for the analysis here 
are the total number of permits in equilibrium X*, the equilibrium amount of effort 
devoted to permit production e*, and the loss of output relative to the equilibrium with no 
permits: 
 
Y = Af(N) – Af(l*)[1 – t(X*)].        (6) 
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Note that it is possible to have a golden equilibrium in which no permits are 
issued (e* = 0) and income is maximized. But given the assumptions about f the contrary 
result is not possible.  In other words, there is no possibility of a perfectly corrupt society.  
The economic interpretation for this result is that for at least some interval labor must be 
used for production so that there is some output to be distributed to permit owners.  
Denmark had a score of 10.0 in the 1998 TI ratings, which the organization characterizes 
as “perfectly corruption free.”  No nation, in contrast, has thus far received a score of 
zero.  A sufficient condition for the golden equilibrium is that ge(0, α) < Afl(N).  This 
condition is more likely as α is greater.  If it does not hold than an interior solution 
obtains. 
Several results follow directly from analysis of the above framework.  First, 
corruption is a negative function of α.  Second, there will be co-movements in the 
equilibrium size of the state X* and the equilibrium amount of corruption e* as α varies.   
The weaker are the exogenous constraints on the productivity of permit-creation, the 
bigger its relative return and hence the larger the relative division of N among l and e.  
This result is explicitly derived in Krueger (1974), and is the central point of Tullock 
(1967).   Thus, states with higher (lower) α should have both more (less) government 
interference and more (less) corruption.  This result requires that the two variables be 
considered in a simultaneous framework.  The idea that corruption and government are 
both endogenous also appears in Erlich and Lui (1999). 
 
2.  Corruption and productivity 
Another important implication is that more technologically advanced societies 
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may have less corruption, for at least one and possibly two reasons.  In the usual way, 
technological progress in production is modeled as an increase in A.  Totally 
differentiating (6) and rearranging terms yields 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )
dA
dX
dX
XdtlAf
dA
dlXtlAfXtlfNf
dA
Yd +−−−−= 11 .  (7) 
 
 The change inY will always have two components.  The first is due to the direct 
opportunity cost of a given amount of rent-seeking.  Output must be created using less 
than the full employment endowment N because labor in the amount e* is unavailable for 
production because it has been diverted to creation.  This distance, the diversion effect, is 
given by A[f(N) – f(e*)].  This is the effect emphasized historically in the rent-seeking 
literature.  The second source of inefficiency, the millstone effect, is caused by 
production away from the frontier with the smaller labor pool.  It occurs because permit 
production destroys some part of potential income.  The diversion effect moves 
production back along the production frontier, and the millstone effect moves the 
equilibrium within it. 
An increase in A increases the marginal return to production labor, and so labor is 
reallocated from e to l.  Permit production declines, and the diversion effect is 
unequivocally smaller, as represented in (7) by ( ) ( )[ ]
dA
dlXtlf −1 .  However, the direction 
of the change in the millstone effect, and hence the total loss Y , is ambiguous.  On the 
one hand less effort is being diverted from production, and fewer permits are being 
produced, so the tax on production t(X*) is smaller.  In (7) this is given by 
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( ) ( )
dA
dX
dX
XdtlAf , which can be restated as ( ) ( )
dA
dl
de
dX
dX
XdtlAf− .  On the other hand, the 
smaller fraction is being taken of greater output, and so in absolute terms it is still 
possible for Y  to grow.  This positive effect of higher productivity on Y  is given by the 
remaining terms in (7), ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]XtlfNf −− 1 . 
Whether or not the total amount of corruption increases or decreases because of 
the increase in A thus becomes an empirical question, but permit production 
unambiguously declines.  The answer depends first on the responsiveness of g to changes 
in e.  The more concave g is, the less reallocation of e will be needed to restore wage 
equality in the two sectors.  This means that the absolute value of the diversion effect is 
lower and the likelihood that the total millstone effect on output, and hence the two 
effects combined, is negative is greater.   An analogous argument holds for the concavity 
of f: the less concave it is, the less reallocation of labor between the sectors occurs.  If 
large, discrete changes in A occur, this increases the income-destroying portion of the 
millstone effect, and hence makes it more likely that the deadweight loss from corruption 
increases.  Note that this is a contrast to MSV, who find that an improvement in 
productivity cannot lead to an increase in appropriation. 
 Other than in MSV, the relation between the state of production technology and 
the social cost of corruption has not been emphasized in the literature.  Even in MSV the 
establishment and strengthening of property-rights protection, which establishes the 
productivity of rent-seeking effort and is so important in that model, is largely 
unexplored.  Here, nations with more advanced division of labor or production 
technology may have more to lose from corruption.  In a society with low productivity, 
the effort spent seeking permits may be diverted from, for example, street peddling.  But 
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in an advanced society, permit-generating effort will be diverted from productive activity 
of far greater value owing to complex division of labor and the presence of large amounts 
of productivity-enhancing technology, e.g. from a semiconductor factory.  It is hence is 
certainly more costly on a per-unit basis and may be more costly in total.   
This is a significant claim because of the light it sheds on the relation between 
corruption and prosperity.  While it is well-established that corruption harms economic 
growth, it is also true that increasing the gains to exchange will lower the return to 
corruption.  Depending on the nature of the collective-choice process, the greater losses 
to corruption in a more productive society may result in a greater investment in its 
control.  The stylized fact of the coincidence of prosperity and clean governance may not 
be simply a function of corruption deterring growth, but of lack of growth providing little 
motivation for investment in fighting corruption, and a great deal of motivation for 
engaging in it.  If the model is an accurate description of the corruption process, nations 
with higher productivity will empirically have less corruption and will be wealthier, not 
just because they are more productive but because there is less deadweight loss from 
permit-seeking.   
 
3.  The empirical model 
The implications 
 Several empirical questions arise from the above framework, beyond the most 
elementary one of the relation between technological advances and corruption.  The first 
is an older controversy descended from the fatalistic Virginia school of public choice.  
Krueger (1974) and MSV depict a rent-seeking trap in which extensive government 
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intervention raises the return to appropriation, which draws labor away from production 
and causes the production of yet more intervention.  Government activity beyond the 
protection of property rights will cause more corruption.  If a rent-seeking trap develops 
of the sort predicted by Krueger and MSV, government size will increase corruption, and 
corruption too will increase government spending.  There is also a particular variant with 
respect to democracy.  For example, Cheung (1998) argues that it promotes not just poor 
economic performance but corruption as well, as politicians auction off government 
favors to factions in an electorate ill-prepared to appreciate the costs of such measures.  
On the other hand the Chicago school of public choice argues that governance, 
and democratic governance in particular, is a means to provide public services that 
coexist with rent-seeking in a manner that minimizes the latter.  Politicians and 
bureaucrats are subject to competitive pressures, which may differ in type but not in 
fundamental nature from those of market traders.  Excessively costly intervention 
provokes competition from political traders – electoral candidates, potential appointees to 
the bureaucracy, etc. – who bid down both the level of intervention and the level of 
bribery and other costs associated with it.  In other words, political markets behave in 
exactly the same way as any other markets.  The argument is laid out most famously in 
Becker (1983), and finds echoes in Olson (2000).  Collective choice determines spending, 
which then determines lower corruption.  An extension that has proven particularly 
influential is Wittman (1989), who argues that democracy in particular improves the 
competitiveness of the political process, and hence should enhance efficiency, defined 
not around income maximization but preferences of the citizenry. 
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 If the Chicago hypothesis is correct, we would expect that institutional features of 
societies that lower the cost of political competition – i.e., that lower g' – would lower the 
amount of corruption.  Such features might include open immigration and emigration 
laws, freedom of thought (in press, speech and religion), and limits on the ability of the 
state to prosecute political opposition.  The Wittman variant would also suggest that 
democratic means for deciding political power should promote more effective corruption 
control.   
The two schools of thought also have different implications for the meaning of 
government spending.  In Virginia-school thinking it is simply rents successfully sought, 
while in Chicago-school thinking it is something that arises from public desires for social 
insurance, construction of public goods or other widely desired goals beyond property-
rights protection. 
 The dynamics of government size over time are themselves the subject of an 
extensive empirical literature.  The claim that national per capita income increases 
demand for government spending, regulation and production has been investigated a 
number of times.  Among the papers that investigate the growth of spending, a key 
controversy is whether the demand for such spending is income-elastic.  While the 
growth of government spending as countries have gotten wealthier has been noted in the 
past (Peltzman, 1980), the large empirical literature on whether the latter causes the 
former is mixed.  For example, Kolluri et al. (2000) and Thornton (1999) find that it does 
and Afxentiou and Serletis (1996 IEJ) find otherwise.  In any event, the theory is 
sufficiently entrenched to indicate that any empirical model in which government 
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spending is a left-hand variable indicates that per capita income be included on the right-
hand side. 
The Empirical Specification 
 Several versions of the following basic simultaneous empirical model are used to 
test the above implications: 
 
 CORRUPTION = a0 + a1 GOV + a2 PCS + a3 OPEN + a4 COMPETITION +  
a5 FRACTION + a6 CULTURE     (8a)
 
 
 GOV = b0 + b1 CORRUPTION + b2 PCGDP + b3 POLRIGHTS +  
b4 URBAN + b5 AVGSCHOOL     (8b) 
 PCGDP = c0 + c1 CORRUPTION + c2 PCS     (8c) 
 
 The estimation is by three-stage least squares.  CORRUPTION is the sum of two 
World Bank measures of governance quality, “corruption control” and “rule of law,” for 
2002.  These survey-based data are available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/tables.asp.  A higher number denotes 
better governance.  GOV is government consumption spending as a fraction of GDP, 
which is a proxy for rent-seeking in Virginia-school thinking and a desired outcome of 
collective choice, to be protected from the impact of corruption, in Chicago-school 
theory.  PCS is the number of personal computers per 1000 population in 2000, and 
proxies for A.  It is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  OPEN is 
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imports plus incoming foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP.  It is included 
on the assumption that more pressure from globalization of the economy results in 
endogenously better governance. 
COMPETITION is a combination of two variables that measure how easy it is to 
bring political pressure to bear to lower corruption.  POLRIGHTS is the Freedom House 
measure of political rights, which ranges from one to seven, with one denoting the most 
freedom.  This variable is widely used in empirical work, but for present purposes it is 
worth investigating it in some detail.  A country’s rating depends on the extent to which 
public officials are chosen by election, whether electoral competition is meaningful, 
whether elected officials have significant power, whether citizens can organize into 
effective political groups, whether the country is free from domination by traditional or 
military hierarchies, and whether minorities have self-governance and/or substantial 
participation in government.  INFOSOC is the 2003 compilation of a measure created by 
Norris (2001, Table 3.2) of the combination of old and new media available in a country 
– of the penetration of newspapers, radio, television and stationary and mobile telephones 
plus the percentage of the population that regularly uses the Internet, the percentage that 
uses personal computers and the number of Web hosts.   
POLRIGHTS and INFOSOC measure two different aspects of the cost of 
changing government policy, including anti-corruption efforts.  The former measures the 
cost to citizens of opposing a policy once they have made a decision on its merit, and the 
latter measures how costly it is to gain the information necessary to make the decision.4  
                                                 
4.  The argument that freedom of thought, i.e. of speech, religion and the press, is a way 
to make information markets more competitive has been made by Posner (2003).  
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Because it is more narrowly defined, INFOSOC is a superior arrangement than Freedom 
House’s companion measure to POLRIGHTS, which measures civil liberties and is 
widely used in other work.  While the civil-liberties measure is partly based on “freedom 
of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion, it also incorporates a 
“generally equitable system of the rule of law.” 5  It is thus best seen as a measure of both 
an input and an output in the framework here.   
FRACTION is the combination of the measures of ethnic, linguistic and religious 
fractionalization generated by Alesina (2003).  If greater tribal fractionalization raises the 
costs of coordination across tribal lines to fight corruption or facilitates the creation of 
smaller tribally defined groups around which to organize, greater fractionalization can in 
the framework here increase the marginal productivity of permit-production effort.6  That 
paper finds that, on a simple correlation basis, this index is positively correlated with 
corruption.  Finally, CULTURE stands for vectors of cultural dummies that attempt to 
account for global differences in preferences that might make corruption more or less 
undesirable.  While the model assumes that corruption is undesirable because it lowers 
income, it is possible that corrupt practices yield offsetting utility.  Such a cultural source 
for corruption has been theoretically posited by Huang and Wu (1994) and Montaner 
(2000), though theoretically discounted by Paldam (2002).  There are three attempts to 
measure such differences, based on geography, colonial heritage or modal religion.  
Dummies are included in the first specification for sub-Saharan Africa, Spanish-speaking 
                                                 
5.  Quoted descriptions are from Freedom House (2003). 
6.  For an analysis of widespread tribal fractionalization proving productive for rent-
seeking in India see Osborne (2001).   
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Latin America, the former Soviet Union and members of the Arab League.  The second 
specification includes dummies for Anglo-American, French or Iberian colonial heritage.  
The third uses dummies taking the value one if the modal religion is Protestant 
Christianity (including Anglicanism), Catholicism or Islam, the three religions with 
sufficient representation in the data set to merit inclusion.  PCGDP and URBAN are the 
2000 values of per capita income and the percentage of the population that is urban, from 
the WDI. 
 (8a) includes, in addition to the causation from government to corruption posited 
by the rent-seeking literature, three elements of α – political competition, information 
production and fractionalization.  PCS measures A.  If the MSV model is correct it should 
be positively signed.  In addition to including the amount of government spending to test 
for the simultaneous rent-seeking trap, (8b) contains variables recommended by some of 
the growth-of-government literature, which contends that public spending expands in 
higher-income and more urbanized (Peltzman, 1980; Kau and Rubin, 2002) nations.  (8c) 
is the equation for equilibrium income, Af(l*)[1-t(X*)].   
 Results are reported in Table 1.  Because INFOSOC and POLRIGHTS are highly 
correlated (ρ = -.5870), a model without POLRIGHTS in (8a) is also reported for each 
cultural specification.  With respect to the prime issue raised in the above analysis, in all 
specifications a higher level of technological productivity is associated with less 
corruption.  Other issues are clarified as well.  The result of Alesina (2003) is somewhat 
robust to the extension here, in that FRACTIONALIZATION is significant at at least the 
ten-percent level in five of the six specifications.  POLRIGHTS is significant in all 
specifications in which it is included.   
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 The results of the variables representing the competitiveness of political markets 
are striking.  In the specifications with both variables POLRIGHTS is significant in the 
expected direction while INFOSOC is only significant (in the expected direction) once, 
when it is the only political-market competition variable included.  This result suggests 
that political competition is extremely important in promoting better governance, and that 
information sufficient to allow citizens to agitate for it prevails even when penetration of 
new and old media is not particularly pronounced.  It may be that the necessary 
information about corruption’s nature, scope and particulars can emerge even without 
such conventional measures of its availability, so that the means to act on the information 
is of primary importance.  Political markets, in other words, can function well (at least 
with respect to corruption) even when the market size of the formal information-
generating industry is not large. 
As for the cultural dummies, the only constant finding is that LATIN is significant 
and negatively signed.  Religious and colonial-heritage variables are never significant.  
Nations with Latin backgrounds tend to have more than the expected amount of 
corruption, other things equal.  Figure 3 plots the actual amount of corruption versus what 
would be expected without the Latin penalty for Latin countries in the data set, i.e. the 
predicted value from the structural-form estimation of (8a) in the full specification 
without accounting for the Latin dummy.  The average Latin country in the sample is 
45.3 percent more corrupt than would be expected (n = 9).  This anomaly, the only 
consistent cultural result, remains to be explained.  Other than that, corruption appears to 
be a phenomenon of income maximization rather than intrinsic preferences. 
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Figure 3 – Expected corruption for Latin nations. 
 Also of interest is the failure to confirm the standard version of the rent-seeking 
model as it applies to government spending.  Both corruption and government spending 
are typically significant in the simultaneous framework.  But unlike rent-seeking theory 
predicts, the signs are positive.  The quality of governance is always a positive and 
significant predictor of the amount of spending, while spending is in three of six 
specifications a significant predictor of quality of governance.  In other words, nations 
that have greater government spending tend to spend more on corruption control for a 
given level of productivity, and nations with better governance are willing to engage in 
more government spending.  This suggests that government spending grows for reasons 
external to corruption, but if it is bigger because of social preferences then societies may 
find it worthwhile to invest more in corruption control, a topic explored in Section 4 
below.  The results, combined with the positive effect of more effective political 
competition on corruption control, provides support for optimistic models of political 
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competition generally and electoral competition in particular as means to control the 
deadweight losses of government spending. 
 
4.  Interpretation and Speculation 
The results are suggestive on a number of counts with respect to the causes and 
effects of corruption.  One finding is that the relation between corruption and government 
spending is the opposite of what traditional models of rent-seeking would predict if the 
former is an output of the latter, other things equal.  In addition, Fig. 1 suggests that 
wealthy nations that devote large percentages of national income to extensive welfare 
states are also among the least corrupt.  That is a phenomenon that begs explanation.  
Given that large amounts of income are transferred via the government in such programs 
as state pensions and health-care systems, why are these societies, with so many tempting 
rent-seeking targets, not more corrupt than they are?  The answer may be that large 
government spending, particularly in an advanced society, carries a corruption penalty 
that is too high.  If corruption also causes each unit of government spending to be subject 
to corruption-induced waste, more corruption implies that these costs, too, are greater.  It 
is then easier to justify spending more resources on the prevention of such waste by 
greater enforcement of property rights.  The role of an independent judiciary as suggested 
by Landes and Posner (1975) provides one plausible means of corruption control, 
although the lack of any measures of judicial independence prevents a direct test of an 
association between government spending and such independence. 
The findings may also explain what has come to be known as the “Tullock 
paradox.”  Rent-seeking scholars have puzzled for years over the seemingly small 
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amount of rent-seeking expenditures relative to the size of the rents being sought.  Most 
of the evidence has been anecdotal, with Tullock himself (1997) citing a large number of 
examples from the U.S.  But societies that invest a great deal in the rule of law both lower 
the returns to rent-seeking and insure that the rents that are parceled out are more stable, 
thus discouraging endless cycles of rent-seeking warfare.  While the paradox has always 
focused on the seemingly implausibly high benefit/cost ratios for the winners in a 
vigorous rent-seeking market, it is worth remembering that for every winner there may be 
many losing pressure groups.  Strategies that raise α will also cause each of these groups 
to spend few resources in its unsuccessful efforts.  The most important effect of cleaner 
governance is thus to insure that the combined amount spent by winners and losers is 
small. 
The results also suggest that there is an under-emphasized dynamic and 
endogenous aspect to corruption.  While it is surely true that corruption hampers 
economic growth, it is also true that rapid growth and rising prosperity increase 
the social cost of corruption.  If the market for governmental authority is at least 
somewhat competitive, whether via elections or not, then as nations prosper their 
political systems should begin to weed out the most corrupt practices accordingly.  
If α is lowered over time by such a Becker (1983)-type competitive process, the 
relatively high amount of corruption in poorer societies may be due not just to the 
deleterious effects of corruption on growth but to the fact that the costs, political 
and otherwise, of the investments needed to protect against it are not yet justified 
by the benefits.  If education, modern technology efficiently applied and the 
division of labor advance sufficiently rapidly to enable rapid growth then the 
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corruption tax may grow so costly that political competition overcomes the inertia 
of existing rent-seeking pressures and brings about political changes to reduce it.  
If not countries may stagnate in the rent-seeking trap.   
History is replete with anecdotes of better governance and prosperity 
coinciding.  While he does not make the connection, Barzun (2000) notes that 
Venice was by a substantial margin the best-governed state in late-Renaissance 
Europe, even as it was the most commercial.  The puzzle of governance in 
Renaissance Italy has also drawn the attention of Putnam (1993).  Southern Italy 
was governed vertically, with a feudal hierarchy extending down from the king, 
while Northern Italy was governed horizontally, with mutual defense pacts 
between relatively equal community associations.  But the usual assumption is 
that causation runs from government structure to prosperity – better governance 
led to more wealth creation.  However corruption control, with its enforcement 
requirements and the need to provide adequate compensation to civil servants, is 
not free, and its cost may have to be justified for a welfare-maximizing 
government to find it worthwhile.   
The pattern of corruption may well have an endogenous timeline as a 
country industrializes, just as income distribution has been demonstrated to have 
(Kuznets, 1968).  There may be a takeoff point for anti-corruption efforts that is 
analogous to and indeed may trail by some consistent margin the better-known 
takeoff stage in industrialization.  Once there is a widespread introduction of 
enough productivity-enhancing shocks the two effects of cleaner governance 
enhancing growth and higher productivity enhancing corruption control may 
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reinforce one another.  Anecdotal evidence on societies suddenly making 
substantial efforts to control corruption is common.  Singapore and Hong Kong, 
which are now thought of as model states with respect to corruption control, were 
actually quite corrupt until reforms were launched in the mid-1960s in the former 
case and the early 1970s in the latter, after rapid growth had begun but well before 
it had ended.  Similar launches of anti-corruption efforts have been documented 
for the United Kingdom, the first industrial power, in the mid-nineteenth century 
and for the U.S. later in that century (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).  If the dating of 
these efforts is accurate it appears that they all occurred after the industrialization 
process was well underway.  Miwa and Ramseyer (2000) present an example 
from the other side in which Japanese firms in the early twentieth century, when 
industrialization was still young, established arbitration procedures to avoid a 
very corrupt judiciary. 
The ability to use government to transfer wealth is in some sense 
instability in property rights, in that the right to use property in exchange is 
constrained.  The firm that requires a license to import (especially if it must pay a 
bribe to get one) finds its ability to exchange resources it owns in voluntary 
exchange for that import limited and more costly.  The domestic monopolist 
protected by bribes lowers the purchasing ability of the labor time of its 
customers.  The problem of corruption control may be just an example of the 
broader Demsetz (1967) analysis of property rights evolving only when the 
benefits to establishing them justify the costs of enforcing them. 
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5.  Conclusion 
 Development is about dynamics and transformation.  Thus how corruption 
might evolve over time is a question of great interest.  The introduction of modern 
technology and economic organization brings with it all manner of well-known 
changes – migration to the cities, declining fertility, etc.  The cost of corruption is 
something else that changes over time.  Raising the relative return to production 
may cause an endogenous decrease in rent-seeking activity.  Further, if 
government officials have self-interest that promotes corruption but the society as 
a whole has an interest in controlling it, these two functions trade off.  That 
corruption is a negative function of the cost of creating opportunities for it is a 
central finding of this paper.  The implication is that policies that promote 
productivity, e.g. improvements in education and public health or liberalized 
economies, can generate incentives for investing in the rule of law.  This is in no 
way to diminish the importance of organized anti-corruption campaigns in poor 
countries, but just as with environmental and safety regulation in there are limits 
to the ability of the state to achieve goals by passing laws, limits that are much 
more compelling in impoverished nations.   
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Table 1 
Regression Results 
Geography as culture 
With POLRIGHTS 
WBSUM    GOV    PCGDP
INTERCEPT -1.418555 INTERCEPT 15.38464*** INTERCEPT 5502.004*** 
  (-1.28)    (5.76)          (8.38) 
GOV  .1296418* WBSUM  3.891733*** PCS        29.84462*** 
  (2.03)    (3.45)          (4.48) 
PCS  .006269*** PCGDP  -.0006735** WBSUM        2272.393*** 
  (4.23)    (-2.61)          (4.16) 
OPEN  -.0027672 POLRIGHTS .0537489 
  (-1.11)    (0.14) 
FRACTION -.3747026* URBAN  .0854309* 
  (-2.20)    (2.22) 
INFOSOC .0133384 
  (1.16) 
POLRIGHTS -.1890665* 
  (-2.24) 
AFRICA  .1708384 
  (0.60) 
ARAB  .414682 
  (0.92) 
LATIN   -.8088764** 
  (-3.17) 
USSR  -1.007727** 
 (-2.83) 
R2  .8272    .1059    .8913 
Χ2  416.1654***   27.14104***   568.0146*** 
N  69      
Without POLRIGHTS 
WBSUM    GOV    PCGDP
INTERCEPT -3.382208*** INTERCEPT 18.79233*** INTERCEPT 5561.989*** 
  (-3.19)    (11.03)          (8.49) 
GOV  .2010441** WBSUM  34.435863*** PCS        29.02824*** 
  (2.68)    (4.12)          (4.37) 
PCS  .0044369* PCGDP  -.0008045** WBSUM        2343.126*** 
  (2.55)    (-3.27)          (4.30) 
OPEN  -.002575  POLRIGHTS -.3253623 
  (-1.01)    (-1.01) 
FRACTION -.256598  URBAN  .0651084* 
  (-1.36)    (1.78) 
INFOSOC .0277866* 
  (1.99) 
AFRICA  .1075546 
  (0.35) 
ARAB  -.0699911 
  (-0.17) 
LATIN   -.6418411* 
  (-2.13) 
USSR  -.8740332* 
 (-2.38) 
R2  .6932    .0061    .8903 
Χ2  213.0734***   36.47703***   568.9656*** 
N  69      
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Table 1 (continued) 
Colonial heritage as culture 
With POLRIGHTS 
WBSUM    GOV    PCGDP
INTERCEPT -1.195998 INTERCEPT 13.40274*** INTERCEPT 5568.614*** 
  (-1.11)    (5.76)          (7.22) 
GOV  .1077118* WBSUM  2.434738* PCS        28.94224*** 
  (1.67)    (1.93)          (3.35) 
PCS  .0082935*** PCGDP  -.0003975 WBSUM       2350.046*** 
  (4.71)    (-1.44)          (3.24) 
OPEN  .000366  POLRIGHTS -.0786562 
  (0.10)    (-0.19) 
FRACTION -.4631047* URBAN  .0905269* 
  (-2.31)    (2.34) 
INFOSOC .0016048 
  (0.13) 
POLRIGHTS -.1818573** 
  (-2.74) 
ANGLO  .2605764 
  (0.87) 
FRANCE  .3304371 
  (1.04) 
IBERIA   -.4587754 
  (-1.58) 
R2  .8337    .2352    .8903 
Χ2  381.0644***   21.67442***   555.7198*** 
N  69      
Without POLRIGHTS 
WBSUM    GOV    PCGDP
INTERCEPT -1.918384* INTERCEPT 18.79233*** INTERCEPT 5561.989*** 
  (-1.74)    (11.03)          (8.49) 
GOV  .0971011  WBSUM  34.435863*** PCS        29.02824*** 
  (1.45)    (4.12)          (4.37) 
PCS  .00776608*** PCGDP  -.0008045** WBSUM        2343.126*** 
  (4.13)    (-3.27)          (4.30) 
OPEN  .0015961  POLRIGHTS -.3253623 
  (0.39)    (-1.01) 
FRACTION -.4289032* URBAN  .0651084* 
  (-2.01)    (1.78) 
INFOSOC .0144997 
  (1.14) 
ANGLO  .2497119 
  (0.78) 
FRANCE  .1556793 
  (0.47) 
IBERIA   -.3361216 
  (-1.08) 
R2  .8202    .1905    .8857 
Χ2  344.3236***   25.66064***   558.6742*** 
N  69      
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Table 1 (continued) 
Religion 
With POLRIGHTS 
WBSUM    GOV    PCGDP
INTERCEPT -.7609738 INTERCEPT 12.87168*** INTERCEPT 5614.329** 
  (-0.59)    (5.76)          (6.95) 
GOV  .0720183  WBSUM  2.030967* PCS        28.32376** 
  (0.84)    (1.93)          (3.07) 
PCS  .0086001*** PCGDP  -.0003246 WBSUM       2403.163** 
  (5.04)    (-1.44)          (3.09) 
OPEN  .0018012  POLRIGHTS -.1206088 
  (0.51)    (-0.30) 
FRACTION -.3019184* URBAN  .0926311* 
  (-1.77)    (2.31) 
INFOSOC .0055977 
  (0.44) 
POLRIGHTS -.209615* 
  (-2.49) 
CATHOLIC -.3171243 
  (-1.10) 
PROTESTANT -.3725017 
  (-0.97) 
ISLAM   .2875778 
  (0.57) 
R2  .8484    .2525    .8895 
Χ2  398.3437***   21.19363***   551.5256*** 
N  69      
Without POLRIGHTS 
WBSUM    GOV    PCGDP
INTERCEPT -3.047503* INTERCEPT 18.79233*** INTERCEPT 5561.989*** 
  (-2.46)    (11.03)          (8.49) 
GOV  .1570492  WBSUM  34.435863*** PCS        29.02824*** 
  (1.56)    (4.12)          (4.37) 
PCS  .0066399** PCGDP  -.0008045** WBSUM        2343.126*** 
  (3.15)    (-3.27)          (4.30) 
OPEN  .0015362  POLRIGHTS -.3253623 
  (0.42)    (-1.01) 
FRACTION -.1787926 URBAN  .0651084* 
  (-1.01)    (1.78) 
INFOSOC .019743 
  (1.26) 
CATHOLIC -.1133079 
  (-0.35) 
PROTESTANT -.3263573 
  (-0.83) 
ISLAM   .0645997 
  (0.14) 
R2  .7539    .1992    .8868 
Χ2  207.8016***   23.51664***   5583.3751*** 
N  69      
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